Secure cloud computations: Description of (fully)homomorphic ciphers
  within the P-adic model of encryption by Khrennikov, Andrei & Yurova, Ekaterina
ar
X
iv
:1
60
3.
07
69
9v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
4 M
ar 
20
16
Secure cloud computations:
Description of (fully)homomorphic ciphers
within the P-adic model of encryption
Andrei Khrennikov and Ekaterina Yurova
International Center for Mathematical Modelling
in Physics and Cognitive Sciences
Linnaeus University, Va¨xjo¨, S-35195, Sweden
Andrei.Khrennikov@lnu.se
November 6, 2018
Abstract
In this paper we consider the description of homomorphic and fully
homomorphic ciphers in the p-adic model of encryption. This model
describes a wide class of ciphers, but certainly not all. Homomorphic
and fully homomorphic ciphers are used to ensure the credibility of
remote computing, including cloud technology. The model describes
all homomorphic ciphers with respect to arithmetic and coordinate-
wise logical operations in the ring of p-adic integers Zp. We show that
there are no fully homomorphic ciphers for each pair of the considered
set of arithmetic and coordinate-wise logical operations on Zp. We
formulate the problem of constructing a fully homomorphic cipher as
follows. We consider a homomorphic cipher with respect to operation
"∗" on Zp. Then, we describe the complete set of operations "G",
for which the cipher is homomorphic. As a result, we construct a
fully homomorphic cipher with respect to the operations "∗" and "G".
We give a description of all operations "G", for which we obtain fully
homomorphic ciphers with respect to the operations "+" and "G" from
the homomorphic cipher constructed with respect to the operation
"+". We also present examples of such "new" operations.
keywords: p-adics, p-adic functions, homomorphic ciphers, fully homo-
morphic ciphers, dynamical systems, 1-Lipschitz
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1 Introduction
Cloud computing and storage solutions provide users and enterprises with
various capabilities to store and process their data in third-party data cen-
ters, [1]. Homomorphic encryption is a form of encryption that allows com-
putations to be carried out on ciphertext, thus generating an encrypted result
which, when decrypted, matches the result of operations performed on the
plaintext. A cryptosystem that supports arbitrary computation on cipher-
texts is known as fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), [2]. The existence of
an efficient and fully homomorphic cryptosystem would have great practical
implications in the outsourcing of private computations, for instance, in the
context of cloud computing, [3].
A brief review of the known homomorphic encryption algorithms is pre-
sented in [14]. Examples of implemented fully homomorphic ciphers exist -
see, for example, [11], [12], [13], [16]. 1
The general idea of homomorphic (and fully homomorphic) encryption is
as follows (for example, [23], [24]). Suppose we have a set of data M . The
operations g1 : M ×M → M, g2 : M ×M → M are defined on the set M
(for homomorphic encryption only one operation is required). It is necessary
to find the value of an expression W (d1, . . . , dn), which is defined through
the operations g1 and g2 on the data d1, . . . , dn ∈ M. By analogy with the
formulas of Boolean algebra, the expressionW can be considered as a formula
in the basis g1 and g2 (for more details see section 5). If the calculation of the
formula W is performed remotely (for example, using cloud services), then
the user sends the data d1, . . . , dn to an untrusted environment (for example,
to the cloud server). After that, the result of the computing returns to the
user. In this case, the user’s data become open.
We understand a cipher as a family of bijective transformations of the
set M, where each transformation is identified by a certain parameter – the
encryption key. Suppose we have a cipher with the following property with
respect to the operations g1, g2. For every transformation of encryption fa,
where a is a key, the following relations fa(g1(x, y)) = g1(fa(x), fa(y)) and
fa(g2(x, y)) = g2(fa(x), fa(y)), x, y ∈ M hold. Then, fa(W (d1, . . . , dn)) =
W (fa(d1), . . . , fa(dn)). This means that the remote computations are per-
formed on encrypted data fa(d1), . . . , fa(dn) and the result of calculations
W (d1, . . . , dn) is obtained in encrypted form fa(W ). That is, only the user
1However, there are some drawbacks in these schemes. For example, in the scheme of
C. Gentry, the size of the ciphertext and computational complexity for encryption and
decryption grows exponentially depending on the number of operations on the plaintext.
In [16], to compute the encrypted value of the product of plaintexts, it is necessary to use
one of the plain texts explicitly.
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has access to the data d1, . . . , dn. In general, this approach provides complete
trust in remote computing.
In this paper, we consider the description of all homomorphic and fully
homomorphic ciphers for the p-adic model of encryption with respect to a
given set of operations, namely, arithmetic ("+" and "·") and coordinate-
wise logical ("XOR" and "AND"), defined on the set of p-adic integers Zp.
This model involves the automata implementation of encryption functions
on the set of words in the alphabet {0, 1, . . . , p− 1}.
We start our paper by recalling definitions that are related to the p-adic
analysis, as well as introducing the necessary notations.
In section 2 we describe the p-adic model of encryption. Moreover, we
show that the problem of description of homomorphic (fully homomorphic)
ciphers is reduced to the description of the measure-preserving 1-Lipschitz
functions f : Zp → Zp, which defines a homomorphism with respect to a
given operation (relatively, to a given pair of operations) on Zp.
In the p-adic model of encryption the Theorems 3.1 and 3.3 describe
all homomorphic ciphers with respect to arithmetic operations "+", "·" and
coordinate-wise logical operations "XOR" and "AND" on Zp. Based on these
theorems, Proposition 4.1 shows that a fully homomorphic cipher does not
exist with respect to all possible pairwise combinations of the operations from
the set {“ + ”, “ · ”, “XOR”, “AND”}. In this regard, in section 4 we discuss
the following possibility of constructing a fully homomorphic cipher within
the p-adic model of encryption. Let us choose a homomorphic cipher with
respect to a given operation "∗" (for example, we take the operation "+" as
"∗"). Then we set on Zp the new operation G : Zp × Zp → Zp such that a
given cipher is homomorphic. Operation G can be set as a convergent in the
p-adic metric power series on Zp. In this case, the homomorphic cipher is a
fully homomorphic cipher with respect to the operations "∗" and "G". Of
course, the new operation "G" will not have such properties as associativity,
commutativity, etc. In Proposition 4.2 we give a description of all operations
"G", for which we obtain fully homomorphic ciphers with respect to the
operations "+" and "G" from the homomorphic cipher with respect to the
operation "+". At the end of the section 4, we present examples of such
"new" operations.
In section 5 we discuss the possibility of remote computing security by
using a fully homomorphic encryption on particularly chosen operations for
a given computational procedure (that is, the formulas implemented by a
computer program).
3
1.1 P -adic numbers
For any prime number p the p-adic norm | · |p is defined on Q in the following
way. For every nonzero integer n let ordp(n) be the highest power of p
which divides n. Then we define |n|p = p−ordp(n), |0|p = 0 and |
n
m
|p =
p−ordp(n)+ordp(m).
The completion of Q with respect to the p-adic metric ρp(x, y) = |x− y|p
is called the field of p-adic numbers Qp. The metric ρp satisfies the so-called
strong triangle inequality |x ± y|p ≤ max (|x|p; |y|p). The set Zp = {x ∈
Qp : |x|p ≤ 1} is called the set of p-adic integers.
Hereinafter, we will consider only the p-adic integers. Every x ∈ Zp can be
expanded in canonical form, namely, in the form of a series that converges for
the p-adic norm: x = x0+px1+. . .+p
kxk+. . . , xk ∈ {0, 1, . . . , p−1}, k ≥ 0.
Let a ∈ Zp and r be positive integers. The set Bp−r(a) = {x ∈ Zp :
|x− a|p ≤ p−r} = a + prZp is a ball of radius p−r with center a.
1.2 P -adic functions
In this paper, we consider functions f : Zp → Zp, which satisfy the Lipschitz
condition with constant 1 (i.e. 1-Lipschitz functions). Recall that f : Zp →
Zp is a 1-Lipschitz function if
|f(x)− f(y)|p ≤ |x− y|p, for all x, y ∈ Zp.
This condition is equivalent to the following: x ≡ y (mod pk) follows f(x) ≡
f(y) (mod p k) for all k ≥ 1.
For all k ≥ 1 a 1-Lipschitz transformation f : Zp → Zp of the reduced
mapping modulo pk is
fk−1 : Z/p
kZ→ Z/pkZ, z 7→ f(z) (mod pk). (1.1)
Mapping fk−1 is well defined (the fk−1 does not depend on the choice of
representative in the ball z + pkZp).
1.2.1 Van der Put series
P -adic functions can be represented in the form of the van der Put series.
The van der Put series is defined in the following way. Let f : Zp → Zp
be a continuous function. Then there exists a unique sequence of p-adic
coefficients B0, B1, B2, . . . such that
f(x) =
∞∑
m=0
Bmχ(m, x) (1.2)
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for all x ∈ Zp. Here the characteristic function χ(m, x) is given by
χ(m, x) =
{
1, if |x−m|p ≤ p−n;
0, otherwise,
where n = 0 if m = 0, and n is uniquely defined by the inequality pn−1 ≤
m ≤ pn − 1 otherwise (see Schikhof’s book [10] for detailed presentation of
the theory of the van der Put series). The number n in the definition of
χ(m, x) has a very natural meaning. It is just the number of digits in a
base-p expansion of m ∈ N0. Then⌊
logpm
⌋
= (the number of digits in a base-p expansion for m)− 1,
therefore n =
⌊
logpm
⌋
+ 1 for all m ∈ N0 and
⌊
logp 0
⌋
= 0 (recall that ⌊α⌋
denotes the integral part of α).
The coefficients Bm are related to the values of the function f in the
following way. Let m = m0+ . . .+mn−2p
n−2+mn−1p
n−1, mj ∈ {0, . . . , p−1},
j = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1 and mn−1 6= 0, then
Bm =
{
f(m)− f(m−mn−1pn−1), if m ≥ p;
f(m), otherwise.
(1.3)
1-Lipschitz functions f : Zp → Zp in terms of the van der Put series were
described in [10]. We follow Theorem 3.1 [22] as a convenience for further
study. In this theorem, the function f presented via the van der Put series
is 1-Lipschitz if and only if |Bm|p ≤ p
−⌊logp m⌋ for all m ≥ 0. Assuming
Bm = p
⌊logp m⌋bm, we find that the function f is 1-Lipschitz if and only if it
can be represented as
f(x) =
∞∑
m=0
p⌊logp m⌋bmχ(m, x) (1.4)
for suitable bm ∈ Zp, m ≥ 0.
1.2.2 Coordinate representation of 1-Lipschitz functions
In this section we describe a coordinate representation of p-adic functions,
see, for example, [21].
We recall that any p-adic integer (as an element of the ring Zp) can be
expanded into the series:
x = x0 + p x1 + . . .+ p
kxk + . . . , xj ∈ {0, 1, . . . , p− 1}.
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Let us denote
(x)k = x0 + x1p+ . . .+ xk−1p
k−1, k ≥ 1,
[x]k = (x0, x1, . . . , xk−1), k ≥ 1. (1.5)
Let functions δk(x), k = 0, 1, 2, . . . be k-th digit in a base-p expansion of
the number x ∈ Zp, i.e. δk : Zp → {0, 1, . . . , p− 1} , δk(x) = xk.
Any map f : Zp → Zp can be represented in the form:
f(x) = δ0(f(x)) + pδ1(f(x)) + . . .+ p
kδk(f(x)) + . . . . (1.6)
According to Proposition 3.33 in [9], f is a 1-Lipschitz function if and
only if for every k ≥ 1 the k-th coordinate function δk(f(x)) does not depend
on δk+s(x) for all s ≥ 1, i.e. δk(f(x + p
k+1Zp)) = δk(f(x)) for all x ∈
{0, 1, . . . , pk+1 − 1}.
Taking into account notation 1.5 for k ≥ 0, we consider the following
functions of p-valued logic
ϕk : {0, . . . , p− 1} × . . .× {0, . . . , p− 1}︸ ︷︷ ︸
k+1
→ {0, . . . , p− 1},
and ϕk : [x]k+1 7→ δk(f(x)).
Then any 1-Lipschitz function f : Zp → Zp can be represented as
f(x) = f(x0 + . . .+ p
kxk + . . .) =
∞∑
k=0
pkϕk(x0, . . . , xk) =
∞∑
k=0
pkϕk([x]k+1).
(1.7)
The function ϕk(x0, . . . , xk) can be defined by its sub-functions obtained
by fixing the first k variables (x0, . . . , xk−1). By 1.5, the sub-function of
the function ϕk(x0, . . . , xk) which is obtained by fixing the variables x0 =
a0, . . . , xk−1 = ak−1, ai ∈ {0, . . . , p − 1}, is denoted by ϕk,[a]k, where a =
a0+ pa1+ . . .+ p
k−1ak−1. In these notations, the function ϕk(x0, . . . , xk) can
be represented as
ϕk(x0, . . . , xk) =
pk−1∑
a=0
I[a]k(x0, . . . , xk−1)ϕk,[a]k(xk), (1.8)
where I[a]k is a characteristic function, i.e.
I[a]k(x0, . . . , xk−1) =
{
1, if (x0, . . . , xk−1) = [a]k;
0, otherwise.
.
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Thus, we can rewrite the 1-Lipschitz function f : Zp → Zp as
f(x) =
∞∑
k=0
pkϕk(x0, . . . , xk) = ϕ0 +
∞∑
k=1
pk
pk−1∑
a=0
I[a]k([x]k−1)ϕk,[a]k(xk). (1.9)
We call the relation 1.9 the coordinate representation of 1-Lipschitz func-
tion f .
Any function ϕk can be given by a polynomial of the ring of (k+1)-variate
polynomials (Z/pZ)[x0, . . . , xk], with coefficients from the residue ring Z/pZ,
whose degree in each variable is at most p− 1. In other words, ϕk is defined
as an element of a factor-ring (Z/pZ)[x0, . . . , xk] modulo an ideal generated
by all polynomials xpi − xi, i = 0, 1, . . . , k.
The function ϕk can be represented in the form (expansion by the leading
variable xk):
ϕk(x0, . . . , xk) = x
p−1
k αp−1(x0, . . . , xk−1) + . . .+ α0(x0, . . . , xk−1),
where αi(x0, . . . , xk−1) ∈ (Z/pZ)[x0, . . . , xk−1], i = 0, 1, . . . , p− 1. In partic-
ular,
ϕk,[a]k = x
p−1
k αp−1([a]k) + . . .+ α0([a]k)
is a polynomial from (Z/pZ)[xk] (αi([a]k) ∈ Z/pZ, i = 0, 1, ..., p− 1).
Thus, the coordinate functions ϕk,[a]k, ϕ0 can be considered as a function
of p-valued logic and as a transformation of the ring Z/pZ.
1.3 P -adic dynamics
Dynamical system theory studies trajectories (orbits), i.e. sequences of iter-
ations:
x0, x1 = f(x0), . . . , xi+1 = f(xi) = f
(i+1)(x0), . . . ,
where f (s)(x) = f(f(. . . f(x)) . . .)︸ ︷︷ ︸
s
.
We consider a p-adic autonomous dynamical system 〈Zp, µp, f〉 ; for more
details see, for example, [4], [5], [6], [17], [18]. The space Zp is equipped
with a natural probability measure, namely, the Haar measure µp normalized
so that µp(Zp) = 1. Balls Bp−r(a) of nonzero radii constitute the base of
the corresponding σ-algebra of measurable subsets, µp(Bp−r(a)) = p
−r. The
function f : Zp → Zp is continuous on Zp.
A measurable mapping f : Zp → Zp is called measure-preserving if
µp(f
−1(U)) = µp(U)
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for each measurable subset U ⊂ Zp.
Criteria of measure-preservation for 1-Lipschitz functions are presented
in the following theorems.
Theorem 1.1 (V. Anashin, [4], [5] or [9]). A 1-Lipschitz functions f : Zp →
Zp preserves the measure if and only if fk = f (mod p
k) is bijective on Z/pkZ
for any k = 1, 2, . . . .
Theorem 1.2 (Theorem 2.1, [18]). A 1-Lipschitz function f : Zp → Zp
represented by the van der Put series 1.4 preserves the measure if and only
if
1. {b0, b1, . . . , bp−1} establish a complete set of residues modulo p
(i.e. f(x) is bijective modulo p);
2. the elements in the set {bm+pk , bm+2pk , . . . , bm+(p−1)pk} are all nonzero
residues modulo p for any m = 0, . . . , pk − 1, k ≥ 2.
Theorem 1.3 (Theorem 2.1 [17]). A 1-Lipschitz function f : Zp → Zp
represented in the coordinate form 1.9 preserves the measure if and only if
all functions ϕ0 and ϕk,[a]k , a ∈ {0, 1 . . . , p
k − 1}, k ≥ 1 are bijective on
{0, . . . , p− 1}.
2 Model
We consider the following automata model of encryption. Recall that A =
〈T ,S,L, S, L〉 is called an automaton if T is a finite set of input symbols
(input alphabet); L is a finite set of output symbols (output alphabet); S is
a set of states (this set is not necessarily finite); S : T × S → S is a state
transition function; L : T × S → L is an output function. Automaton A
transforms the input words from the alphabet T into the output words from
the alphabet L by the following rules:
1. Suppose that at some moment of discrete time k, k ≥ 0, the automaton
A is in the state sk ∈ S;
2. the symbol tk ∈ T is fed to the input of the automaton A;
3. as a result, the automaton A changes its state to sk+1 = S(tk, sk);
4. the symbol lk+1 = L(tk, sk) ∈ L appears on the output of A.
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Remember that the initial automaton As0 = 〈T ,S,L, S, L, s0〉 is an au-
tomaton A; where one state s0 ∈ S is fixed, s0 is called the initial state.
Automaton As0 transforms the complete set of words in the alphabet
T into the complete set of words in the alphabet L; see Figure 1. This
transformation we denote by fAs0 .
✲ ✲
. . . , tk, . . . , t1, t0 l0, l1, . . . , lk, . . .
As0
Figure 1
In particular, fAs0 maps a set of words of length n ∈ N in the alphabet
T - Tn to the set of words of length n in the alphabet L - Ln. Such induced
mapping is denoted by fAs0 ,n (i.e., fAs0 ,n : Tn → Ln, n ∈ N).
As the input and output alphabets T and L, we consider the set {0, 1, . . . , p−
1} = T = L, p is a prime number. The complete set of words in the alphabet
{0, 1, . . . , p − 1} can be considered as Zp (i.e., the number t0 + pt1 + . . . +
pktk + . . . is associated with the word (t0, t1, . . . , tk, . . .)). In this case, fAs0 is
a map Zp to itself.
The paper [8] provides the following theorem (here we reformulate the
theorem in a convenient form for further discussion).
Theorem 2.1 (V. Anashin, Theorem 2.1 [8]). The automaton function fAs0 :
Zp → Zp of the automaton As0 = 〈T ,S,L, S, L, s0〉, T = L = {0, 1 . . . , p−1}
is 1-Lipschitz. Conversely, for every 1-Lipschitz function f : Zp → Zp there
exists an automaton As0 = 〈{0, 1 . . . , p− 1},S, {0, 1 . . . , p− 1}, S, L, s0〉 such
that f = As0.
We assume that all induced functions fAs0 ,n are bijective on the set of
words of length n, n ≥ 1 (i.e., by the notation 1.1, fAs0 ,n = fAs0 (mod p
n)
is bijective on Z/pkZ). Then, by Theorem 1.1 1-Lipschitz function fAs0 pre-
serves the measure. In this case, by Proposition 4.26 from [9] the function
fAs0 is bijective on Zp.
We consider the words in the alphabet T = {0, 1, . . . , p − 1} as a plain
text, and the words in the alphabet L = {0, 1, . . . , p − 1} as a ciphertext,
then the family of bijective on Zp functions fAs0 , s0 ∈ S defines a cipher,
where the initial state s0 is an encryption key.
Remark 2.2. Not all codes are implemented in the framework of this model
of encryption. For example, the RSA cryptosystem or block ciphers can not
be implemented in our encryption model. This is due to the fact that these
ciphers use alphabets where the number of symbols is not a prime.
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Thus, a family of bijective on Zp transformations fAs0 , s0 ∈ S, each
of which implements an automaton A, form a cipher C. On Zp we set an
operation "g" as the function g : Zp × Zp → Zp. We say that the cipher C is
a homomorphic cipher with respect to the operation "g" if for every s0 ∈ S
fAs0 (g(x, y)) = g(fAs0 (x), fAs0 (y)), x, y ∈ Zp.
Suppose that operations "g1" and "g2" (it is possible to consider more
than two operations) are defined on Zp, that is g1 : Zp × Zp → Zp, g2 :
Zp × Zp → Zp. We call a cipher C a fully homomorphic with respect to the
operations "g1" and "g2", if
fAs0 (g1(x, y)) = g1(fAs0 (x), fAs0 (y)), x, y ∈ Zp;
fAs0 (g2(x, y)) = g2(fAs0 (x), fAs0 (y)), x, y ∈ Zp.
Thus, the problem of describing homomorphic (fully homomorphic) ci-
phers in the p-adic model of encryption is as follows.
Find all functions f : Zp → Zp such that
1. f is 1-Lipschitz function (i.e., f is realized by some automaton);
2. f preserves the measure (ensures the uniqueness of decryption);
3. f defines a homomorphism with respect to a given set of operations on
Zp (one operation is for a homomorphic cipher, two operations are for
a fully homomorphic cipher).
3 Homomorphic ciphers
In this section we give a description of 1-Lipschitz functions f : Zp → Zp,
which preserve the measure and define the homomorphism relative to a binary
operation on Zp, i.e., to some function g : Zp × Zp → Zp. In this section we
shall consider only the following operations:
1. ordinary arithmetical operations "+" and "·" on Zp;
2. coordinate-wise logical operations "XOR" and "AND". These opera-
tions are defined on Zp as follows. Let p-adic numbers x, y ∈ Zp be
defined in the canonical form, i.e.,
x = x0 + x1p+ . . .+ xkp
k + . . . ; y = y0 + y1p+ . . .+ ykp
k + . . . ,
where xi, yi ∈ {0, 1, . . . , p− 1}, i ≥ 0. Then the canonical representa-
tions of the p-adic numbers xXORy and xANDy have the forms
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xXORy = ((x0 + y0) mod p) + ((x1 + y1) mod p)p+ . . .
+ ((xk + yk) mod p)p
k + . . . ;
xANDy = ((x0 · y0) mod p) + ((x1 · y1) mod p)p+ . . .
+ ((xk · yk) mod p)p
k + . . . ;
Note that the functions that define the homomorphisms with respect
to arithmetic operations "+" and "·" on the p-adic analogue of the field of
complex numbers were considered in [10]. In contrast to this case, we consider
the functions that preserve the measure and define the homomorphism on Zp
for a wider set of binary operations. Full description of measure-preserving,
1-Lipschitz functions, which define homomorphisms for specific operations on
Zp, are presented in Theorem 3.1 (for arithmetic operations) and Theorem 3.3
(for logical operations). In other words, these theorems provide a description
of all homomorphic ciphers with respect to each of the operations "+", "·",
"XOR" and "AND". Note that functions that equal identically zero or one
are not considered in these theorems.
Theorem 3.1 (Arithmetic operations). Let f : Zp → Zp be a 1-Lipschitz
function, which differs from zero and unit functions.
Then
1. f defines a homomorphism with respect to the operation "+", i.e.,
f(x+ y) = f(x) + f(y), x, y ∈ Zp if and only if
f(x) = Ax, A ∈ Zp, A 6= 0.
Such a function preserves the measure if and only if A 6≡ 0 (mod p);
2. f defines a homomorphism with respect to the operation "·", i.e.,
f(x · y) = f(x) · f(y), x, y ∈ Zp if and only if
f(x) =
{
pkAk(ts0(modp)) · (1 + p t)
a, if x = pk(t0 + tp),
0, if x = 0
(3.1)
where t0 6≡ 0 (mod p), t ∈ Zp, a, A ∈ Zp, s ∈ {1, . . . , p− 1}, k ≥ 0.
Such a function preserves the measure if and only if
A 6≡ 0 (mod p), GCD (s, p− 1) = 1, a 6≡ 0 (mod p).
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Proof. Let f define a homomorphism with respect to the operation "+".
Then f(m) = m · f(1), m ∈ Z. Let f(1) = A ∈ Zp, A 6= 0. Since 1-Lipschitz
function f is continuous on Zp and Z is dense in Zp, then f(x) = A · x,
x ∈ Zp. The function f(x) = A ·x preserves the measure if and only if A 6≡ 0
(mod p) (see, for example, Lemma 4.41 in [9]). It is clear that the function
f(x) = Ax defines a homomorphism with respect to addition on Zp.
Let us prove the second statement of the theorem. Let f defines a ho-
momorphism with respect to multiplication on Zp. Since f is distinct from
the identity and zero functions (i.e., there are x, y ∈ Zp such that f(x) 6= 1
and f(y) 6= 0), and f is the homomorphism, then f(0) = 0. Moreover, since
f is the homomorphism, then f(1) = 1. As f is a 1-Lipschitz function, then
f(p) ≡ 0 (mod p) and f(1+pt) ≡ 1 (mod p). 1-Lipschitz function f induces
a mapping f0 : Z/pZ→ Z/pZ, z 7→ f(z) (mod pk). Because f is the homo-
morphism, then f0 is also homomorphic on Z/pZ with respect to multiplica-
tion. The function f0 is a non-zero function (otherwise, f(1+pt) ≡ f0(1) ≡ 0
(mod p)). Then there exists s ∈ {0, 1, . . . , p − 2} such that f0(z) = z
s. Let
f(p) = pA, A ∈ Zp.
Since any x ∈ Zp, x 6= 0 can be represented in the form
x = prt0(1 + pt), t ∈ Zp, t0 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p− 1}, r ≥ 0,
then the function f , which defines a homomorphism with respect to multi-
plication on Zp, can be represented in the form
f(x) =
{
pk · Ak · (ts0(modp)) · φ(1 + pt), if x = p
k(t0 + t · p), k ≥ 0,
0, if x = 0
where t0 6≡ 0 (mod p), t ∈ Zp, a, A ∈ Zp, s ∈ {0, 1, . . . , p − 2} (here we
consider the function ts0(modp) as a mapping of the set {1, 2, . . . , p− 1} into
itself), and 1-Lipschitz function φ : 1+pZp → 1+pZp define a homomorphism
with respect to multiplication on 1 + pZp.
Let us find the representation of the function φ. Let EXPp : pZp → 1+pZp
be the p-adic exponent and LNp : 1 + pZp → pZp be the p-adic logarithm.
We consider the function g : pZp → pZp such that g(τ) = LNp(φ(EXPp(τ))).
Then, the function g defines a homomorphism with respect to addition on
pZp:
g(τ1 + τ2) = LNp(φ(EXPp(τ1 + τ2))) =
= LNp(φ(EXPp(τ1) · EXPp(τ2))) =
= LNp(φ(EXPp(τ1)) · φ(EXPp(τ2))) =
= LNp(φ(EXPp(τ1))) + LNp(φ(EXPp(τ2))) =
= g(τ1) + g(τ2).
12
Therefore, there exists a ∈ Zp such that g(τ) = aτ . Since EXPp(LNp(1+
pz)) = 1 + pz, z ∈ Zp, then
EXPp(g(τ)) = EXPp(a · τ) = EXPp(τ)
a = φ(EXPp(τ)).
Let x = 1 + pt = EXPp(τ), τ ∈ pZp. Then φ(x) = xa, a ∈ Zp.
Thus, the function f can be represented in the form
f(x) = f(pkt0(1 + pt)) = p
k · Ak · (ts0(modp)) · (1 + pt)
a.
Performing the corresponding calculations, we see that the function of
this type defines a homomorphism on Zp with respect to multiplication.
Let us find the values A, a ∈ Zp, s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p− 1}, where the function
f of the form 3.1 preserves the measure. For this we use the criterion of
Theorem 1.2. Let us find the value of the van der Put coefficients of the
function f . Let t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , pr−1}, t0 ∈ {1, . . . , p−1}, h ∈ {1, 2 . . . , p−1},
k ≥ 0. Then B0 = f(0) = 0 and
bt0pk+tpk+1+pk+rh =
1
pk+r
Bt0pk+tpk+1+pk+rh ≡
≡
1
pk+r
(
f(t0p
k + tpk+1 + pk+rh)− f(t0p
k + tpk+1)
)
≡
≡ a · Ak · (ts0(modp)) · h (mod p), r ≥ 1,
bt0pk =
1
pk
Bt0pk ≡
1
pk
f(t0p
k) ≡ Ak · (ts0(modp)) (mod p), r ≥ 0.
Since ts0 6≡ 0(modp), then {bt0pk+tpk+1+pk+rh : h = 1, 2, . . . , p − 1} co-
incides with the set of all non-zero residues modulo p if and only if a 6≡ 0
(mod p), and A 6≡ 0 (mod p). The set {bt0pk : t0 = 1, 2, . . . , p−1} coincides
with the set of all non-zero residues modulo p as GCD (s, p− 1) = 1. Since
f(t0 + pt) ≡ ts0 (mod p), t0 ∈ {1, . . . , p − 1} and f(0) = 0, then f(modp)
is bijective on Z/pZ. Then, by Theorem 1.2 the function f preserves the
measure if and only if
a 6≡ 0 (mod p); A 6≡ 0 (mod p); GCD (s, p− 1) = 1.
Remark 3.2. If in 3.1 we set a = n, s = n, A = pn−1 for some n ∈ N,
then f(x) = xn. That is, all such polynomials define a homomorphism with
respect to multiplication on Zp. Functions of the form f(x) = x
n for n ≥ 1
do not preserve the measure.
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Theorem 3.3 (Logical operations). Let f : Zp → Zp be a 1-Lipschitz func-
tion defined in the coordinate form, i.e.,
f(x) = f(x0 + . . .+ p
kxk + . . .) =
∞∑
k=0
pkϕk(x0, . . . , xk),
where ϕk(x0, . . . , xk) are p-valued logical functions. Then
1. f defines a homomorphism with respect to the operation "XOR" if and
only if
ϕk(x0, . . . , xk) = α
(k)
0 x0 + α
(k)
1 x1 + . . .+ α
(k)
k xk,
where α
(k)
i ∈ {0, . . . , p− 1}, 0 ≤ i ≤ k, k ≥ 0.
Such functions preserve the measure if and only if α
(k)
k 6≡ 0 (mod p),
k ≥ 0;
2. f defines a homomorphism with respect to the operation "AND" if and
only if
ϕk(x0, . . . , xk) = x
s
(k)
0
0 · x
s
(k)
1
1 · · ·x
s
(k)
k
k ,
where s
(k)
i ∈ {1, . . . , p− 1}, 0 ≤ i ≤ k, k ≥ 0.
Such functions preserve the measure if and only if
f(x) = f(x0 + px1 + . . .+ p
kxk + . . .) =
∞∑
k=0
pk(x
s
(k)
k
k (modp)),
where GCD (s
(k)
k , p− 1) = 1, k ≥ 0.
Proof. Let f define a homomorphism with respect to the operation "XOR"
on Zp, i.e., ϕk(x0+ y0, . . . , xk + yk) = ϕk(x0, . . . , xk)+ϕk(y0, . . . , yk), xi, yj ∈
{0, 1, . . . , p− 1}, k ≥ 0.
Let
ϕk,r(x) = ϕk(0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
r
, x, 0, . . . , 0), 0 ≤ r ≤ k.
Since ϕk,r(x + y) = ϕk,r(x) + ϕk,r(y), x, y ∈ Z/pZ, then ϕk,r(x) is the ho-
momorphism on Z/pZ with respect to addition. Therefore, ϕk,r(x) = a
(k)
r x,
ar ∈ Z/pZ. Since
ϕk(x0, . . . , xk) = ϕk,0(x0) + . . .+ ϕk,k(xk),
then ϕk(x0, . . . , xk) = a
(k)
0 x0 + a
(k)
1 x1 + . . . + a
(k)
k xk, k ≥ 0, where a
(j)
i ∈
{0, . . . , p− 1}.
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It is clear that a function represented by the coordinate functions defines
a homomorphism on Zp with respect to the operation "XOR".
Let
f(x) = f(x0 + x1p + . . .) =
∞∑
k=0
([a
(k)
0 x0 + a
(k)
1 x1 + . . .+ a
(k)
k xk](modp))p
k.
Here, by the notation (∗)(modp), we emphasize the fact that ϕk is defined
by the operations on Z/pZ. Coordinate sub-functions of the function f from
the representation 1.9 have the form c + a
(k)
k xk, c ∈ {0, . . . , p − 1}. These
sub-functions are bijective on Z/pZ as a
(k)
k 6≡ 0 (mod p). Thus, by Theorem
1.3 the function f preserves the measure as soon as a
(k)
k 6≡ 0 (mod p), k ≥ 0.
Let us prove the second statement of the theorem. Let f be a homomor-
phism with respect to the operation "AND" on Zp, i.e.,
ϕk(x0 · y0, . . . , xk · yk) =
= ϕk(x0, . . . , xk) · ϕk(y0, . . . , yk), xi, yj ∈ {0, 1, . . . , p− 1}, k ≥ 0.
Let
ϕk,r(x) = ϕk(1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
r
, x, 1, . . . , 1), 0 ≤ r ≤ k.
Since ϕk,r(x ·y) = ϕk,r(x) ·ϕk,r(y), x, y ∈ Z/pZ, then ϕk,r(x) is the homomor-
phism on Z/pZ with respect to multiplication. Therefore, ϕk,r(x) = x
s
(k)
r ,
sr ∈ {0, 1, . . . , p− 2}. Since
ϕk(x0, . . . , xk) = ϕk,0(x0) · · ·ϕk,k(xk),
then ϕk(x0, . . . , xk) = x
s
(k)
0
0 · x
s
(k)
1
1 · · ·x
s
(k)
k
k , k ≥ 0 (ϕk is given through the
operations on Z/pZ).
It is clear that a function represented by the coordinate functions defines
a homomorphism on Zp with respect to the operation "AND".
Let
f(x) = f(x0 + x1p+ . . .) =
∞∑
k=0
([x
s
(k)
0
0 · x
s
(k)
1
1 · · ·x
s
(k)
k
k ](modp))p
k.
Here ϕk is also defined by the operations on Z/pZ.
Coordinate sub-functions of the function f from the representation 1.9
have the form a
s
(k)
0
0 · a
s
(k)
1
1 · · ·a
s
(k)
k−1
k−1 · x
s
(k)
k
k , a
si
i ∈ {0, . . . , p − 1}, 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1.
These sub-functions are bijective on Z/pZ as soon as a
s
(k)
0
0 · a
s
(k)
1
1 · · · a
s
(k)
k−1
k−1 ≡ 1
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(mod p) for any ai ∈ {0, . . . , p − 1}, 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 (this is equivalent to
s
(k)
0 ≡ s
(k)
1 ≡ . . . ≡ s
(k)
k−1 ≡ 0 (mod p)) and GCD (s
(k)
k , p− 1) = 1.
Thus, by Theorem 1.3 the function f preserves the measure as soon as
s
(k)
0 ≡ s
(k)
1 ≡ . . . ≡ s
(k)
k−1 ≡ 0 (mod p) and GCD (s
(k)
k , p− 1) = 1, k ≥ 0.
4 Fully homomorphic ciphers
In this section we describe fully homomorphic ciphers with respect to each
pair of operations from the set {“+ ”, “ · ”, “XOR”, “AND”}. As we show in
Proposition 4.1, there are no such fully homomorphic ciphers.
Therefore, we consider the following problem. Suppose there exists a ho-
momorphic cipher with respect to the operation "∗". We consider "+" on
Zp as such an operation (these ciphers were described in Theorem 3.1). We
want to find a new operation "G" such that this cipher defines a homomor-
phism with respect to new operation "G". All possible new operations for
a homomorphic cipher with respect to "+" are described in Proposition 4.2.
As a method of setting a new operation, we consider convergent in the p-adic
metric power series in two variables.
Let H(∗) be the set of all non-zero and non-trivial 1-Lipschitz functions,
which define a homomorphism with respect to the operation "∗" on Zp and
preserve the measure. For arithmetic and logical coordinate-wise operations,
the sets
H(+), H(·), H(XOR), H(AND) (4.1)
are described in Theorems 3.1 and 3.3.
The set of functions, consisting of identical function f(x) = x, is denoted
by I.
Proposition 4.1. In the notation 4.1 the following relations hold:
1. H(+) ∩ H(·) = I;
2. H(+) ∩ H(XOR) = I;
3. H(+) ∩ H(AND) = I;
4. H(·) ∩ H(XOR) = I;
5. H(·) ∩ H(AND) = I;
6. H(XOR) ∩ H(AND) = I;
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Proof. Let us prove the first statement of the theorem. Let f(x) ∈ H(+) ∩
H(·). As f(x) ∈ H(·), then f(1) = 1. Thus, f(1) = A = 1, that is, f(x) = x.
Let us prove the second statement. Let f(x) ∈ H(+) ∩ H(XOR). As
f ∈ H(+), then f(x) = Ax, A ∈ Zp. From f(xXORy) = f(x)XORf(y) it
follows that A(xXORy) = AxXORAy. Suppose x = 1 and y = p− 1. Then
AXOR(p− 1)A = 0. (4.2)
It is clear that this equation holds for A = 1. Let A = A0+A1p+. . . , Ak ∈
{0, . . . , p− 1}. Note that
(p− 1)A = (p− 1)(A0 + A1p+ . . .) =
= [p− A0] + p[A0 − 1 + p− A1] + p
2[A1 − 1 + p−A2] + . . . .
We find the values A0, A1, . . ., using the equality 4.2. We obtain that
p − A0 + A0 ≡ 0 (mod p); A0 − 1 + p− A1 + A1 ≡ 0 (mod p), i.e., A0 = 1;
A1− 1+ p−A2+A2 ≡ 0 (mod p), so A1 = 1 and so on. As a result, we find
that 4.2 also holds for A = 1 + p+ p2 + . . . = 1
1−p
. In this case
f(x) = Ax = A(x0 + px1 + . . .) =
∞∑
k=0
(x0 + x1 + . . .+ xk)p
k. (4.3)
We represent this function in the coordinate form 1.7. Here, we denote
the operation of addition on Z/pZ by "⊕". Note that relation 4.3 for the
function f implies that ϕ0 = x0, ϕ1(x0, x1) = x0 ⊕ x1, x0 + x1 = x0 ⊕
x1 + pδ(x0, x1), where δ(x0, x1) =
x0+x1−x0⊕x1
p
. Since f ∈ H(XOR), then
c0, c1, c2 ∈ {0, . . . , p − 1} should exist such that ϕ2 = c0x0 ⊕ c1x1 ⊕ c2x2 =
x0 ⊕ x1 ⊕ x2 + δ(x0, x1). Since δ(0, 0) = 0, then c2 = 1. Suppose x2 = 0,
x1 = 0 and x2 = 0, x0 = 0, then c0 = 1, c1 = 1. Then
x0+x1−x0⊕x1
p
= 0 for
x2 = 0 and x0 + x1 = x0 ⊕ x1.
This contradiction shows that this type of coordinate representation of
the function f from 4.3 does not coincide with the representation of the
second statement of the Theorem 3.3 (or f 6∈ H(XOR)). Then f(x) = x and
H(+) ∩ H(XOR) = I.
Let us prove statement 3. Suppose that f(x) ∈ H(+) ∩ H(AND), then
we obtain f(pk) = pk = Apk. Then A = 1 and H(+) ∩H(AND) = I.
Let us prove statement 4. Let f ∈ H(·) ∩ H(XOR). As 1 + p + p2t =
1XOR(p+ p2t), then
1 + pA(1 + pt)a = 1XORpA(1 + pt) =
= 1XORf(p(1 + pt)) = f(1XOR(p+ p2t)) =
= f(1 + p+ p2t) = (1 + p + p2t)a (4.4)
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Set t = 0 in 4.4 and differentiate functions from 4.4, then we get
1 + pA = (1 + p)a and A =
(
1
1 + pt
+ p
)a−1
. (4.5)
Set t = 0 in 4.5, we get A = (1 + p)a−1 and 1 + pA = (1 + p)A. Thus
a = A = 1.
Using the representation of the second statement of the Theorem 3.1 and
the second statement of 3.3 for the function f for t ∈ t0+ pZp, t0 6= 0, we get
α
(0)
0 t0 ≡ f(t) ≡ t
s
0 (mod p).
Then α
(0)
0 = 1, s = 1 and the function f can be represented in the form
f(x) =


pkt, if x = pkt, t 6≡ 0 (mod p), k > 0;
t, if x = t, t 6≡ 0 (mod p), k = 0;
0, if x = 0.
Thus, f(x) = x and ∈ H(+) ∩ H(AND) = I.
Let us prove statement 5. Let f ∈ H(·)∩H(AND). Let x = x0+px1+. . .+
xkp
k+. . . , xi ∈ {0, . . . , p−1}. Taking into account the type of representation
of functions from H(·) and H(AND), we obtain that
pkxskk = f(xkp
k) = pkAk(xsk(modp)).
Then, sk = s, k ≥ 0, A = 1. Taking into account the representation of f
from Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.3, we get
(1 + pt)a = f(1 + pt) = f(1 + pt1 + . . .) =
= 1 + p(ts1(modp)) + . . .+ p
k(tsk(modp)) + . . . .
Let us find the values of the van der Put coefficients for each represen-
tation of the function f . Let 1 + pt + pkh = 1 + pt1 + . . . + p
k−1tk−1 + p
kh,
h 6≡ 0 (mod p), then
B1+pt+pkh = (1 + pt+ p
kh)a − (1 + pt)a = ah(1 + pt)a−1pk =
= (1 + . . .+ pk−1(tsk−1(modp)) + p
k(hs(modp)))−
− (1 + . . .+ pk−1(tsk−1(modp))) = h
s(modp)pk.
As ah(1 + pt)a−1pk = hs(modp), then a = 1, s = 1. Thus,
f(x) =


pkt, if x = pkt, t 6≡ 0 (mod p), k > 0;
t, if x = t, t 6≡ 0 (mod p), k = 0;
0, if x = 0,
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That is f(x) = x and H(·) ∩H(AND) = I.
Let us prove statement 6. Let f ∈ H(XOR) ∩ H(AND). Using the coor-
dinate representation of the function f (Theorem 3.3), we obtain
α
(k)
0 x0 + α
(k)
1 x1 + . . .+ α
(k)
k xk = x
s
(k)
k
k , k ≥ 0.
Then, α
(k)
0 x0 + α
(k)
1 x1 + . . .+ α
(k)
k−1xk−1 is a constant as soon as
α
(k)
0 = . . . = α
(k)
k−1 = 0, α
(k)
k = 1, s
(k)
k = 1.
Thus, f(x) = x and H(XOR) ∩H(AND) = I.
Proposition 4.1 shows that there are no fully homomorphic ciphers for
all pairs of arithmetic and coordinate-wise logical operations. However, we
may reformulate the problem of finding fully homomorphic ciphers as follows.
Let "∗" be an operation on Zp, and f : Zp → Zp be a family of 1-Lipschitz
functions that preserve the measure. Then we define a homomorphism with
respect to this operation. We find operation "G" on Zp such that each
function f defines a homomorphism with respect to this operation, and that
"G" differs from "∗", i.e., f(G(x, y)) = G(f(x), f(y)), x, y ∈ Zp. As a result,
we find that the function f defines a homomorphism with respect to both
operations "∗" and "G", i.e., the family of functions f can be used as a
fully homomorphic cipher. As new operation "G", we consider an arbitrary
mapping G : Zp × Zp → Zp. Of course, such an operation may not be
associative, commutative, etc.
In Proposition 4.2 we give a description of all operations "G" (defined
by power series), where linear functions f(x) = Ax, A ∈ Zp define the
homomorphism with respect to the operation "G". In other words, f is the
homomorphism with respect to addition and to new operation "G".
We set "G" (a function G : Zp × Zp → Zp) as the convergent power
series in Zp×Zp (it is sufficient to require that the general term of the series
converges to zero in the p-adic metric).
The function G(x, y) is given by the convergent power series
G(x, y) = c+ ax+ by +
∞∑
k=1
nk∑
i+j=nk
ci,jx
iyj, ci,j, a, b, c ∈ Zp, (4.6)
where for any nk ∈ {n1, n2, . . . | nk ∈ N, 1 < n1 < n2 < . . .} = NG there
exists 0 ≤ i, j ≤ nk such that ci,j 6= 0, and if n 6∈ NG, then ci,j = 0 for any
0 ≤ i, j ≤ nk, i+ j = n.
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Proposition 4.2. Let f : Zp → Zp, f(x) = Ax, A ∈ Zp, A 6= 0. The
function f defines a homomorphism with respect to the operation "G", given
as the series 4.6 if and only if for NG 6= ∅ :
1. c = 0;
2. nk = dqk + 1, k ≥ 1, where d = GCD(n1 − 1, n2 − 1, . . . , nk − 1, . . .),
qk ∈ N;
3. Ad = 1
and G = ax+ by for any A 6= 0 for NG = ∅.
Proof. Let f = Ax define a homomorphism with respect to the operation
"G", i.e., AG(x, y) = G(Ax,Ay) and NG 6= ∅. Using the representation 4.6,
we get that A satisfies the system of equations
An1 = A, An2 = A, . . . , Ank = A, . . .
or Ank−1 = 1, k ≥ 1. This system of equations is equivalent to the equation
Ad = 1, where d = GCD(n1−1, n2−1, . . . , nk−1, . . .). Let x = 0, y = 0, then
Ac = c and c = 0 (since A 6= 0). It is easy to see that under the conditions of
the proposition, the function f(x) = Ax defines homomorphism with respect
to the operation "G". If NG = ∅, then G(x, y) = c+ ax+ ay and c = 0. The
function f(x) = Ax defines the homomorphism with respect to G = ax+ by
for any A.
Remark 4.3. Here we recall known facts about the number of solutions
of the equation Ad = 1 in Zp. If p ∤ d, then the equation A
d = 1 has
GCD(d, p − 1) solutions in Zp (see, for example, Theorem 3.24 in [9]). If
d = pk, then the equation Ap
k
= 1 has a unique solution A = 1, except when
p = 2 and k = 1 (in this case, the equation A2 = 1 in Z2 has solutions A = 1,
A = −1; see, for example, Theorem 18.9 in [15]). Clearly, for d = pkn, p ∤ d
the equation Ad = 1 has GCD(n, p− 1) solutions in Zp.
Thus, for NG 6= ∅, maximum number of functions of the form f(x) = Ax,
which define the homomorphism with respect to the operation "G", equals
p − 1. If the functions f(x) = Ax are chosen for the construction of fully
homomorphic ciphers with respect to operations "+" and "G", the prime
number p must be large.
Example 4.4. Here are some examples of operations "G", for which the
functions f(x) = Ax define the homomorphism with respect to the operations
"+" and "G" for a suitable choice of A:
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1. G(x, y) = ax+ by, a, b ∈ Zp for any A ∈ Zp, A 6= 0;
2. G1(x, y) = xy
p−1 or G2(x, y) = x
p−1y + xyp−1 for A ∈ Zp, Ap−1 = 1.
The operation G2 is commutative;
3. for p 6= 2, then G(x, y) = x
p−1
2 · y
p−1
2 , Ap−1 = 1;
4. G(x, y) =
∑
∞
s=0 p
s
(
x(p−1)s+1 + y(p−1)s+1
)
= x
1−pxp−1
+ y
1−pyp−1
, andAp−1 =
1.
5 Application
In Proposition 4.1 we have shown that a fully homomorphic cipher does not
exist (within the p-adic model of encryption) for each pair of operations
from the set {“ + ”, “ · ”, “XOR”, “AND”}. Suppose that, using the pairs of
operations from this set, we can write an equation that can be implemented
by a computer program. From this perspective, the result of Proposition 4.1
means that within the p-adic model of encryption there are no "universal"
(i.e., for any software) fully homomorphic ciphers. However, as was shown in
Proposition 4.2, it is possible to construct a fully homomorphic cipher with
respect to a pair of "new" operations on Zp. In this section we will discuss
such a possibility.
We assume that in the framework of the p-adic model of encryption a
computer program implements a formula of the original data. This formula
is written using the set of operations g1 : Zp×Zp → Zp and g2 : Zp×Zp → Zp.
By analogy with the formulas of Boolean algebra, let us define formulas with
respect to the operations g1 and g2 over Zp:
1. variables and operations g1, g2 are formulas;
2. if F1, F2 are formulas, then g1(F1, F2), g2(F1, F2) are formulas.
We denote the set of all formulas defined with respect to operations g1
and g2 as [g1, g2]. For instance, x
3 + y + y2 · z is the formula from the set
[“ + ”, “ · ”]. The following assertion holds.
Proposition 5.1. Let operations g1 : Zp×Zp → Zp and g2 : Zp×Zp → Zp be
defined by the formulas from [“+”, “ ·”]. Let 1-Lipschitz function f : Zp → Zp
define a nontrivial homomorphism with respect to the operations g1 and g2.
Then [g1, g2] ⊂ [“ + ”, “ · ”] and [g1, g2] 6= [“ + ”, “ · ”].
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Proof. Since g1, g2 ∈ [“ + ”, “ · ”], then [g1, g2] ⊂ [“ + ”, “ · ”]. Assume
that [g1, g2] = [“ + ”, “ · ”]. Then "+" and "·" are defined by the formu-
las Ψ“+”(x1, x2) and Ψ“·”(x1, x2) with respect to the operations g1 and g2.
Since f is a homomorphism with respect to g1 and g2, then
f(x1 + x2) = f(Ψ“+”(x1, x2)) = Ψ“+”(f(x1), f(x2)) = f(x1) + f(x2);
f(x1 · x2) = f(Ψ“·”(x1, x2)) = Ψ“·”(f(x1), f(x2)) = f(x1) · f(x2);
i.e. f is the homomorphism with respect to "+" and "·". Then from Propo-
sition 4.1 it follows that f is an identity mapping. This contradicts the
condition of the Proposition.
Proposition 5.1 shows that if a fully homomorphic cipher exists with
respect to certain operations g1 and g2 (formulas with respect to arithmetic
operations "+" and "·"), then the cipher is not applicable for all formulas
from [“+”, “ ·”]. Previously, we assumed the class [“+”, “ ·”] was "universal"
in the sense that any computer program could implement the formula from
this class.
In this regard, we propose the following method using a fully homomor-
phic encryption to secure remote computing within the p-adic model of en-
cryption.
Let W (d1, . . . , dn) be a given formula (or program), by which cloud com-
puting will be performed. Here d1, . . . , dn ∈ Zp stand for data. This formula
can be given, for example, in the basis of the usual arithmetic operations.
Let us find a new pair of operations g1 and g2, such that:
1. the formula W ∈ [g1, g1];
2. fully homomorphic cipher fa with respect to the operations g1 and g2
exists, where a is the key and [g1, g1] 6= [“ + ”, “ · ”].
Then W (fa(d1), . . . , fa(dn)) = fa(W (d1, . . . , dn)). As a result, we are able to
perform cloud computing in secure mode for a given formula (program) W.
Example 5.2. Let
W (x, y, z) = xp−1y(p−1)
2
z + xp−1yp−1z + xpyp(p−1)
(
1 + yp
2
−3p+2
)
be a formula by which cloud computing will be performed.
Let us consider the operation of usual addition "+" in Zp, and the oper-
ation "∗" in Zp defined by a ∗ b = abp−1. Then
W (x, y, z) = z ∗ (x ∗ y) + (z ∗ x) ∗ y + (x ∗ x) ∗ (y ∗ y) + x ∗ ((x ∗ y) ∗ y).
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From Proposition 4.1 it follows that the functions f : Zp → Zp, f(x) =
Ax, A ∈ Zp, A 6= 0 and Ap−1 = 1 define the homomorphisms with respect
to operations "+" and "∗". In other words, the family of such functions is a
fully homomorphic cipher with respect to the given operations. In particular,
f(W (x, y, z)) =W (f(x), f(y), f(z)).
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